من الخطأ الوقوع في تبسيط مجتمع كامل عبر حصره في حزبين أو قائمتين سياسيتين فقط، كما هو الحال مع الطائفة الشيعية في لبنان التي يختزل كثيرون وجودها في حزب الله وحركة أمل.
في الحقيقة، هناك نسبة كبيرة من الشيعة تعبّر عن رفضها وتباعدها عن هذين الحزبين اللذين يسيطران على المشهد السياسي الشيعي منذ عقود. هذا الرفض لا يعني بالضرورة تقليلاً من دورهما أو تأثيرهما، لكن ما يؤكد وجود هذا الانقسام هو المشاركة المحدودة والانتقادات المتزايدة ضد هذه القوى، خصوصاً في الأحداث السياسية والاجتماعية الأخيرة.
أبرز دليل على ذلك كان في انتفاضة 17 تشرين الأول ٢٠١٩، حيث برزت خارطة جديدة لمطالب أهلية وشعبية كانت مناهضة للطريقة التقليدية في الحكم والسيطرة السياسية، وشهدنا مشاركة عدد كبير من الشباب والقطاعات الشيعية الذين عبّروا عن رفضهم للاحتكار السياسي والإقصاء الذي تفرضه هذه القوى. كما أن معدلات المشاركة في الانتخابات النيابية والبلدية التي حصلت مؤخرًا، لطالما كانت مؤشرًا واضحًا على حالة الاستياء وعدم الرضا، حيث اختار كثير من الشيعة عدم التصويت أو الانسحاب من العملية الانتخابية احتجاجًا على واقع الفساد والمحسوبية.
لا يمكن تجاهل الانتهاكات السياسية التي تعرّض لها معارضو الحزبين، والتي بلغت ذروتها في اغتيالات سياسية كان من أبرزها اغتيال الناشط لقمان سليم، الذي كان صوتًا معارضًا ومطالبًا بالشفافية والعدالة في لبنان. هذه الجرائم رسالة واضحة بأن الطريق نحو التغيير السياسي خارج سلطة هذه الحركات ليس سهلاً، وأن هناك محاولات ممنهجة لقمع أي صوت يخالف توجهات السلطة القائمة.
بالإضافة إلى ذلك، يُمنع أو يُعيق كثيرًا استعمال الميغا سنتر وآليات التصويت المتقدمة في الانتخابات البلدية والنيابية، ما يحد من شفافية ونزاهة العملية الانتخابية ويؤثرعلى تمثيل الكتل المعارضة. كما يتم عمدًا عدم إفساح المجال الكافي للمغتربين في الخارج للمشاركة بالتصويت في هذين الاستحقاقين.
من جهة أخرى، تشهد البيئة الشيعية هجرة واسعة النطاق، حيث غادر وهاجر العديد من أبناء الطائفة خلال السنوات الماضية بحثًا عن فرص عمل واستقرار أفضل في الخارج، بالإضافة إلى إحساسهم بالإحباط من الوضع القائم وعدم القدرة على التغيير ضمن النظام السياسي الحالي.
من الضروري أيضًا توضيح أن العقيدة الشيعية في لبنان ليست فارسية وليست مرتبطة إلحاقًا بأي هوية قومية أو ثقافية أخرى، بل هي جزء من الهوية الإسلامية اللبنانية العريقة. الشيعة اللبنانيون يجسّدون تقليدًا إسلاميًا أصيلاً يمتد عبر التاريخ، ويحتفظون بتنوعهم الثقافي والاجتماعي المحلي بعيدًا عن التعميمات التي تربطهم بثقافات أو أجندات خارجية بشكل مطلق.
الشيعة في لبنان هم أكثر من حزب الله وأمل فقط؛ توجد حركات مجتمع مدني وشخصيات سياسية مستقلة تنشط ضمن البيئة الشيعية، تستقطب اهتمام فئات واسعة من الطائفة.
في الختام، على الدولة اللبنانية أن تسعى لوضع قانون انتخابي عصري وشفّاف يضمن لكل اللبنانيين التعبير عن آرائهم بكل حرية ونزاهة، بعيدًا عن المحاصصة والاحتكار، ليس فقط داخل البيئة الشيعية، بل في كل الطوائف والمناطق، لكي يتحقق التمثيل الحقيقي ويُبنى لبنان على قواعد المشاركة الفعلية والمساواة السياسية.
منى الدحداح
شيعة لبنان ليسوا «حزب وأمل» فقط..!
12 سبتمبر 2025 - 00:02
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آخر تحديث 12 سبتمبر 2025 - 00:02
تابع قناة عكاظ على الواتساب
It is a mistake to simplify an entire community by confining it to just two political parties or lists, as is the case with the Shia community in Lebanon, which many reduce to Hezbollah and Amal Movement.
In reality, there is a large proportion of Shia who express their rejection and distancing from these two parties that have dominated the Shia political scene for decades. This rejection does not necessarily diminish their role or influence, but what confirms the existence of this division is the limited participation and increasing criticisms against these forces, especially in recent political and social events.
The most prominent evidence of this was during the uprising on October 17, 2019, where a new map of civic and popular demands emerged that opposed the traditional way of governance and political control. We witnessed a significant participation of many young people and Shia sectors who expressed their rejection of the political monopoly and exclusion imposed by these forces. Additionally, the rates of participation in the recent parliamentary and municipal elections have always been a clear indicator of the state of discontent and dissatisfaction, as many Shia chose not to vote or withdrew from the electoral process in protest against the reality of corruption and favoritism.
The political violations faced by opponents of the two parties cannot be ignored, which peaked in political assassinations, the most notable of which was the assassination of activist Loukman Slim, who was a dissenting voice calling for transparency and justice in Lebanon. These crimes send a clear message that the path to political change outside the authority of these movements is not easy, and there are systematic attempts to suppress any voice that contradicts the directions of the existing authority.
Moreover, the use of mega centers and advanced voting mechanisms in municipal and parliamentary elections is often restricted or obstructed, limiting the transparency and integrity of the electoral process and affecting the representation of opposition blocs. There is also a deliberate lack of sufficient opportunity for expatriates abroad to participate in voting in these two electoral events.
On another note, the Shia environment is witnessing widespread migration, as many members of the community have left and emigrated in recent years in search of better job opportunities and stability abroad, in addition to their sense of frustration with the current situation and their inability to effect change within the current political system.
It is also essential to clarify that the Shia doctrine in Lebanon is not Persian and is not linked to any other national or cultural identity; rather, it is part of the rich Lebanese Islamic identity. Lebanese Shia embody an authentic Islamic tradition that extends throughout history, and they maintain their local cultural and social diversity away from generalizations that link them to external cultures or agendas in an absolute manner.
The Shia in Lebanon are more than just Hezbollah and Amal; there are civil society movements and independent political figures active within the Shia environment, attracting the interest of broad segments of the community.
In conclusion, the Lebanese state must strive to establish a modern and transparent electoral law that guarantees all Lebanese the freedom and integrity to express their opinions, away from sectarian quotas and monopolies, not only within the Shia community but across all sects and regions, so that true representation can be achieved and Lebanon can be built on the foundations of actual participation and political equality.
In reality, there is a large proportion of Shia who express their rejection and distancing from these two parties that have dominated the Shia political scene for decades. This rejection does not necessarily diminish their role or influence, but what confirms the existence of this division is the limited participation and increasing criticisms against these forces, especially in recent political and social events.
The most prominent evidence of this was during the uprising on October 17, 2019, where a new map of civic and popular demands emerged that opposed the traditional way of governance and political control. We witnessed a significant participation of many young people and Shia sectors who expressed their rejection of the political monopoly and exclusion imposed by these forces. Additionally, the rates of participation in the recent parliamentary and municipal elections have always been a clear indicator of the state of discontent and dissatisfaction, as many Shia chose not to vote or withdrew from the electoral process in protest against the reality of corruption and favoritism.
The political violations faced by opponents of the two parties cannot be ignored, which peaked in political assassinations, the most notable of which was the assassination of activist Loukman Slim, who was a dissenting voice calling for transparency and justice in Lebanon. These crimes send a clear message that the path to political change outside the authority of these movements is not easy, and there are systematic attempts to suppress any voice that contradicts the directions of the existing authority.
Moreover, the use of mega centers and advanced voting mechanisms in municipal and parliamentary elections is often restricted or obstructed, limiting the transparency and integrity of the electoral process and affecting the representation of opposition blocs. There is also a deliberate lack of sufficient opportunity for expatriates abroad to participate in voting in these two electoral events.
On another note, the Shia environment is witnessing widespread migration, as many members of the community have left and emigrated in recent years in search of better job opportunities and stability abroad, in addition to their sense of frustration with the current situation and their inability to effect change within the current political system.
It is also essential to clarify that the Shia doctrine in Lebanon is not Persian and is not linked to any other national or cultural identity; rather, it is part of the rich Lebanese Islamic identity. Lebanese Shia embody an authentic Islamic tradition that extends throughout history, and they maintain their local cultural and social diversity away from generalizations that link them to external cultures or agendas in an absolute manner.
The Shia in Lebanon are more than just Hezbollah and Amal; there are civil society movements and independent political figures active within the Shia environment, attracting the interest of broad segments of the community.
In conclusion, the Lebanese state must strive to establish a modern and transparent electoral law that guarantees all Lebanese the freedom and integrity to express their opinions, away from sectarian quotas and monopolies, not only within the Shia community but across all sects and regions, so that true representation can be achieved and Lebanon can be built on the foundations of actual participation and political equality.


