فرض رسوم على العقارات الشاغرة ليس مجرد توجه مالي بحت، بل هو إجراء تنظيمي يعكس رغبة الدولة في إعادة ضبط التوازن في سوق العقار، وتحفيز دورة الاستخدام العادل للأصول غير المستغلة. ومع ما تداولته وسائل الإعلام مؤخراً بشأن توصية اللجنة الوزارية المختصة برفع نسبة الرسوم السنوية على العقارات الشاغرة من 5% إلى 10% من قيمة العقار، فإننا أمام لحظة تنظيمية فارقة تتطلب تفعيل الأدوات الرقابية واستباق محاولات الالتفاف.
فالرسوم المفروضة على العقارات الشاغرة جاءت لتحرك ما كان ساكناً، ولتمنح الأفضلية للمالك الملتزم على المالك المترقب، وتسهم في كبح الممارسات التي تعطل التداول وترفع الأسعار دون مبرر. إلا أن الواقع يُظهر أن بعض الملاك وربما بالتنسيق مع أطراف شكلية قد يلجأون إلى إبرام عقود إيجار ظاهرها قانوني وباطنها تحايلي، بغرض إسقاط تصنيف العقار كـ«شاغر»، وتفادي الرسوم المفروضة.
تُبرم العقود على منصة «إيجار»، وتُسجل رسمياً، ثم يتم إيداع مبالغ الإيجار واستعادتها بطريقة متفق عليها بين المالك والمستأجر الصوري، ليُظهر المالك أنه امتثل للنظام، في حين أن العقار لا يزال فعلياً خالياً من الإشغال. وعند وصول مستأجر حقيقي، يُفسخ العقد الأول ويُحرر عقد جديد، وكأن العقار لم يكن يوماً شاغراً.
هذه الحيلة، وإن بدت في ظاهرها «ذكية»، إلا أنها تفرغ النظام من غايته، وتُنشئ سوقاً رمادية لا تعكس الواقع، وتضعف أدوات تطبيق النظام في التصنيف والمعالجة. بل وتخلق شعوراً بعدم العدالة لدى الملتزمين الذين يتحملون الرسوم فعلياً، في حين يتهرب المتحايلون منها تحت غطاء الشكل النظامي.
ولعل من أبرز ما يمكن اقتراحه هنا هو تطوير أدوات فحص الإشغال، بحيث لا يُعتد بالعقد المسجل وحده، بل يُربط بالبيانات التشغيلية للعقار (كالاستهلاك الكهربائي والمائي، أو الحد الأدنى لمدة إشغال فعلي)، وأن تُمنح الجهات التنظيمية صلاحية مراجعة العقود التي تُفسخ في فترات وجيزة دون أسباب موضوعية. كما ينبغي أن يُنص بشكل صريح على أن التواطؤ في إبرام عقود صورية بقصد التحايل على الرسوم يُعد مخالفة موجبة للعقوبة.
فالتحايل لا يُحارب بالتشديد فقط، بل بالفهم المسبق لطبيعته، والقدرة على تجاوزه تشريعياً وتنفيذياً.
إن الدولة حين تنظم السوق، فإنها لا تقف في مواجهة أحد، بل تحمي الجميع، وتعيد الأمور إلى نصابها. وعلى المجتمع أن يكون ذراعاً مساندة لهذا التنظيم، لا طرفاً باحثاً عن ثغراته.
إن نجاح سياسة فرض الرسوم لا يقاس فقط بتحصيلها، بل بمدى احترامها كأداة لتنظيم السوق. فإما أن نلتزم بجوهر النظام وهدفه، وإما أن يظل «عقار يشاغر النظام»، لا المكان.
تابع قناة عكاظ على الواتساب
Imposing fees on vacant properties is not just a purely financial trend; it is a regulatory measure that reflects the state's desire to recalibrate the balance in the real estate market and stimulate a fair utilization cycle of underutilized assets. With recent media reports regarding the recommendation from the relevant ministerial committee to raise the annual fee rate on vacant properties from 5% to 10% of the property's value, we are facing a pivotal regulatory moment that requires activating oversight tools and preempting attempts to circumvent the rules.
The fees imposed on vacant properties were introduced to stir what had been stagnant, to give preference to the committed owner over the speculative owner, and to help curb practices that disrupt trading and unjustifiably inflate prices. However, reality shows that some owners, possibly in coordination with formal parties, may resort to entering into rental contracts that appear legal on the surface but are deceptive in nature, with the aim of removing the classification of the property as "vacant" and avoiding the imposed fees.
Contracts are concluded on the "Ejar" platform and are officially registered, then rental amounts are deposited and retrieved in a manner agreed upon between the owner and the fictitious tenant, to show that the owner has complied with the system, while the property remains effectively unoccupied. When a real tenant arrives, the first contract is terminated, and a new contract is drafted, as if the property had never been vacant.
This trick, while it may seem "clever" on the surface, undermines the system's purpose, creates a gray market that does not reflect reality, and weakens the tools for applying the system in classification and processing. It also creates a sense of injustice among those who comply and actually bear the fees, while the deceivers evade them under the guise of formal compliance.
One of the most prominent suggestions here is to develop occupancy verification tools, so that the registered contract alone is not sufficient, but is linked to the operational data of the property (such as electricity and water consumption, or a minimum duration of actual occupancy). Regulatory authorities should also be granted the power to review contracts that are terminated within short periods without objective reasons. Furthermore, it should be explicitly stated that collusion in entering into fictitious contracts for the purpose of evading fees constitutes an offense subject to penalties.
Fraud cannot be fought solely through strict measures, but through a prior understanding of its nature and the ability to overcome it legislatively and executively.
When the state regulates the market, it does not stand in opposition to anyone; rather, it protects everyone and restores matters to their rightful order. The community should be a supportive arm of this regulation, not a party seeking its loopholes.
The success of the fee imposition policy is not measured solely by its collection but by the extent to which it is respected as a tool for market regulation. We must either commit to the essence and goal of the system or allow it to remain a "property that circumvents the system," not the place.
The fees imposed on vacant properties were introduced to stir what had been stagnant, to give preference to the committed owner over the speculative owner, and to help curb practices that disrupt trading and unjustifiably inflate prices. However, reality shows that some owners, possibly in coordination with formal parties, may resort to entering into rental contracts that appear legal on the surface but are deceptive in nature, with the aim of removing the classification of the property as "vacant" and avoiding the imposed fees.
Contracts are concluded on the "Ejar" platform and are officially registered, then rental amounts are deposited and retrieved in a manner agreed upon between the owner and the fictitious tenant, to show that the owner has complied with the system, while the property remains effectively unoccupied. When a real tenant arrives, the first contract is terminated, and a new contract is drafted, as if the property had never been vacant.
This trick, while it may seem "clever" on the surface, undermines the system's purpose, creates a gray market that does not reflect reality, and weakens the tools for applying the system in classification and processing. It also creates a sense of injustice among those who comply and actually bear the fees, while the deceivers evade them under the guise of formal compliance.
One of the most prominent suggestions here is to develop occupancy verification tools, so that the registered contract alone is not sufficient, but is linked to the operational data of the property (such as electricity and water consumption, or a minimum duration of actual occupancy). Regulatory authorities should also be granted the power to review contracts that are terminated within short periods without objective reasons. Furthermore, it should be explicitly stated that collusion in entering into fictitious contracts for the purpose of evading fees constitutes an offense subject to penalties.
Fraud cannot be fought solely through strict measures, but through a prior understanding of its nature and the ability to overcome it legislatively and executively.
When the state regulates the market, it does not stand in opposition to anyone; rather, it protects everyone and restores matters to their rightful order. The community should be a supportive arm of this regulation, not a party seeking its loopholes.
The success of the fee imposition policy is not measured solely by its collection but by the extent to which it is respected as a tool for market regulation. We must either commit to the essence and goal of the system or allow it to remain a "property that circumvents the system," not the place.


