سقوف إيران وإسرائيل

Since the battle began, news and analyses have been circulating in the area of weapons, including missiles, defenses, and civilian targets, such as water desalination plants or oil refineries, or in the area of mediations and seeking a diplomatic exit, with various parties pressuring here or there to push the sides toward the stubborn negotiation table.

But what about other decisive factors for each side in the battle, the first of which is food security? Israel relies on imports for essential products: animal feed grains, sugar, rice, and wheat, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, which indicates that its exports to Israel are only about 5%. Additionally, Russia and Ukraine were the main source of wheat until 2022 when the war between them broke out, and here comes the factor of accumulated crises.

Then there is the logistical factor, as most goods to Israel pass through two main seaports: Haifa in the north and Ashdod in the south, in addition to Ben Gurion Airport. All three outlets are subjected to Iranian bombardment, and the factor of accumulation comes again, as the port of Eilat on the Red Sea is almost paralyzed due to previous Houthi attacks.

While the geographical expanse of Iran and the existence of land crossings allow it to import from Turkey and Russia via Iraq, along with its access to the Caspian Sea in the north, suggest an expansion of its options for food imports, it faces the challenge that closing the Strait of Hormuz represents poisoning the well from which everyone drinks.

This affects major imports such as rice and corn, of which more than half is imported from abroad, primarily entering Iran through the ports of Bandar Abbas and Khomeini, both located on the Arabian Gulf, meaning that 14 million tons of grains cannot enter Iran annually through the Strait of Hormuz.

In exploring the factors of internal resilience, one must not overlook the protest movements that have emerged successively in recent years in Tehran, which have been dealt with harshly, from demonstrations over food and water prices to protests over fuel price hikes in 2019, through the Mahsa Amini protests, to the recent demonstrations following the free fall of the Iranian rial last December.

Of course, I do not expect that the protests will lead to political change during the war; we are not in Brussels. However, these cumulative economic pressures, along with food security challenges, create a nucleus for the latent explosion, without overlooking that executions have increased annually from 2022 until 2025. All this pressure has hinted at an unspoken acceptance among some segments of the population for American and Israeli strikes.

On the Israeli domestic front, the issue of reservist soldiers represents an escalating pressure since the outbreak of the Gaza war. The Jerusalem Post indicates that the repeated call-up of reservists acts as a psychological and familial pressure on them. There is also a cumulative economic cost, militarily in general and specifically regarding the salaries of reservist soldiers, as the current war costs more than $4 billion weekly.

There is also a political challenge for Netanyahu regarding the reservist soldiers. He is caught between the fire of the "Haredim," the ultra-Orthodox Jews, whose obedience in exempting students from religious schools deprives Netanyahu of every soldier he needs in one of Israel's largest battles in history. Confronting them would practically mean the fall of his government, as he would become a minority with fifty deputies out of 120 in the Knesset. According to Channel 12, any elections would reduce Likud seats to only 27.

Therefore, what is the ceiling that each side can bear beyond military capabilities? The ability to address internal pain or even endure it can sometimes be a more important factor than military victory in determining the outcome of the battle.