محاولات مستميتة لاستعادة الردع

One of the most significant repercussions of the events of October 7, 2023, is the undermining of the deterrence strategy that Israel has followed rigorously and sometimes recklessly since the June 1967 War. In fact, the deterrence strategy is an existential syndrome, since the declaration of the establishment of Israel, and even before that; since the contemplation of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine and the announcement of the commitment to its establishment at the first Zionist Congress held in Basel, Switzerland (August 29, 1897). That congress culminated in the Balfour Declaration twenty years later (November 2, 1917), leading to the realization of the Zionists' dream, with the help of the British mandate, by announcing the partition of historic Palestine between a Jewish state and an Arab state, with Jerusalem placed under international trusteeship, according to United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 181 (November 29, 1947).

Since the contemplation of establishing a purely Jewish state in Palestine at the end of the 19th century until the realization of the Zionists' dream with the declaration of the establishment of Israel (May 14, 1948), its existence has been linked not to legal recognition by the United Nations but to its ability to maintain its international identity by imposing its existential reality through force (violent physical force) by developing an effective deterrent power as a primary defensive line to entrench its illegal, illegitimate, and immoral reality.

In reality, the Hebrew state has never and will never be able to dispense with external variables, simply because it lacks the necessary resources for that, both politically and militarily. The Hebrew state is always in need of a large and generous international ally, whether to prove the legitimacy of its reality or at the stage of imposing its reality in defense of its existence and consolidating its biblical claims regarding its right to the Promised Land (all of historic Palestine), and even beyond that (Greater Israel, which extends beyond the initial area of Israel, from the river to the sea). In any case, the Hebrew state must strategically rely on a powerful deterrent force in the face of those who compete with it for historic Palestinian land (the Palestinians), as well as impose its coercive reality on its neighbors and anyone who questions its international identity from any powers outside the Middle East.

Since the October War of 1973, Israel has not faced any major breach of the deterrence strategy it developed from that time until the outbreak of the events of October 7, 2023. These events were the first real test of the deterrence strategy it adopts, this time coming from the people of the land themselves (the Palestinians), and not from its traditional enemies (its Arab neighbors). In short, from a strategic perspective, the Palestinians have not despaired of reclaiming their occupied lands, despite the "ogre" of the Israeli deterrence strategy. The events of October 7, 2023, developed into a new reality of conflict that resulted in a real practical challenge to the Israeli deterrence strategy, coming from an unexpected direction, both inside and outside Israel.

Here, a desperate strategic doctrine developed among Zionist theorists, which states: to restore the deterrence strategy at any cost, by testing it on all fronts, and not just against the state's traditional enemies from neighboring Arab countries. A comprehensive test that includes, this time, internal enemies, with the aim of preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state at any cost, while continuing to attempt to neutralize the traditional confrontation front outside historic Palestine, from sovereign states with their conventional defense systems.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu boasts that Israel is engaged in an internal and regional war on six fronts, and that he has won them all! What he overlooked is that the power of his state, with its formidable deterrent capabilities, has not succeeded in defeating the Gaza front, nor in breaking the will of Palestinian resistance, nor in recovering its captives from the resistance, nor even in penetrating the status and trust of the resistance among the Gazans. Since then, Israel has been waging an unequal war on the Gaza front, which is nearing its third year, and has not succeeded in achieving any of its declared objectives in this war yet.

Israel desperately wants to restore the deterrence strategy it has lost by creating illusory victories on fronts with a strategically soft flank, knowing full well that those fronts have been "clinically" dead from a strategic perspective, as they have been neutralized for nearly half a century. Displaying strength against inactive security fronts is not part of any deterrence strategy that any state would adopt.

The futile adventures of the occupation army on the Syrian front, for example: which reached the Syrian capital, including showcasing an air drop and taking prisoners from the Syrian army, are not an effective model for a real deterrence strategy. Compare this, within the evaluation of the Israeli deterrence strategy, to what the Palestinian resistance has achieved in direct confrontation with the Israeli army in the Zaitoun and Sabra areas in Gaza City last (Friday-Saturday).

Strategically: In fact, Israel has lost the deterrence strategy as a tool to affirm its existence at the expense of the rightful owners of the land (the Palestinians).. or as a tool for expansion at the expense of the security and lands of its Arab neighbors, let alone achieving its long-term strategic goal: (claiming the region), regionally.