في لبنان، كانت قضية السلاح محور نقاش مستمر وسط الأزمات المتتالية التي ضربت البلاد خلال العقود الماضية. يُفترض أن السلاح يُستخدم لحماية الوطن والدفاع عن سيادته، ولكن المثل القائل: «السلاح عدو صاحبه»، يحمل في طياته حقيقة مؤلمة، لا سيما حين نتمعّن في تجربة «حزب الله» وسلاحه في الواقع اللبناني.
يرفع حزب الله شعار امتلاكه لترسانة عسكرية ضخمة تهدف بحكم التصريحات الرسمية إلى حماية لبنان من التهديدات الخارجية، خصوصاً الإسرائيلية. إلا أن الوقائع أثبتت محدودية هذا السلاح حتى في حماية قادة الحزب أنفسهم. فقد تعرّض الأمين العام حسن نصرالله وعدد من كبار قادة الحزب لمحاولات استهداف وتهديدات متكررة، ولم تكن تلك الترسانة الأمنية قادرة على صدها بشكل كامل كما يُدَّعى. سواء عبر الاعتداءات المباشرة أو الضربات العسكرية، أظهرت التجارب أن هذا السلاح لم يحل دون وقوع انتهاكات بحق قادة الحزب وبيئتهم الحاضنة.
ومن هنا يتجلى السؤال المحوري: إذا كان هذا السلاح يعجز عن حماية من يديرونه ويمثلونه، فكيف يمكن الوثوق بقدرته على حماية الشعب اللبناني بكل مكوّناته، والدفاع عن لبنان كدولة؟ الواقع أن اعتماد لبنان على هذا السلاح كضمانة أمنية ساهم في تعميق الانقسامات الداخلية وزيادة وتعقيد دائرة الصراعات والأزمات، بدلاً من أن يخلق شعوراً بالأمان والوحدة.
وفيما يتعلق بالأراضي اللبنانية المحتلة، مثل مزارع شبعا وتلال كفرشوبا، لم يُشهد يوماً استخدام هذا السلاح لتحرير هذه المناطق التي تعتبرها لبنان أراضي محتلة.
كما أن حرب إسناد غزة التي خاضها حزب الله أدى إلى احتلال 5 تلال جدد من قبل إسرائيل داخل الأراضي اللبنانية على طول الخط الأزرق، وهي تلة الحمامص وتلة النبي عويضة وجبل بلاط واللبونة والعزية. وهذا يطرح تساؤلات جدية حول فعالية هذا السلاح ودوره الحقيقي في حماية اللبنانيين والدفاع عن سيادة وطنهم.
أما على صعيد الملف البحري، فقد ظهر تنازل واضح من حزب الله في قضية حقل كاريش النفطي. ففي المفاوضات، قبل لبنان ترسيم الحدود البحرية وفق الخط 23 بدلاً من الخط 29 المعتمد من الأمم المتحدة، وهو الخط الذي يمنح لبنان حقوقاً أكثر في هذا الحقل الغني بالغاز. هذا التنازل أتاح لإسرائيل السيطرة الكاملة على حقل كاريش، في حين حصل لبنان على حقل قانا الذي يتطلب لاستخراج موارده موافقة إسرائيل حسب الاتفاق الدولي. هذا المؤشر يعكس تراجعاً واضحاً عن المواقف السابقة التي كانت تؤكد على حماية الحقوق اللبنانية دون تنازل.
وعلى الرغم من التهديدات المتكررة التي أطلقها حزب الله بضرب المنشآت الإسرائيلية في حقل كاريش خلال فترات التوتر، إلا أن هذه التهديدات لم تمنع إسرائيل من مواصلة التنقيب والإنتاج، مما يبرز محدودية قدرة هذا السلاح على حماية سيادة لبنان وأراضيه وحماية مصالحه الوطنية.
إذا كان السلاح الذي يُعلن عنه كأداة لحماية لبنان عاجزاً عن تحرير أراضيه المحتلة، ولا ينجح في حماية حقوقه السيادية، ولم يقِ حدوده من التنازلات التي تسلب جزءاً من ثرواته لصالح العدو، فكيف يمكن أن يكون ضمانة لحماية جميع اللبنانيين؟
بناءً على هذا الواقع، أصبح واضحاً أن هذا السلاح لا يكتفي بعدم حماية صاحبه فحسب، بل صار فعلياً «عدو صاحبه» و«عدو الوطن» والمواطنين. لذلك، على حزب الله أن يُسلم سلاحه للجيش اللبناني قبل نهاية العام الجاري، كما طالبت الحكومة اللبنانية رسمياً استناداً إلى اتفاق الطائف والبيان الوزاري.
الدولة اللبنانية وحدها تتحمّل المسؤولية الحصرية في حماية لبنان وأمنه، ولا بد من أن تكون هي الجهة الوحيدة التي تمتلك السلاح، بعيداً عن أي أدوات أو ميليشيات خارج إطار الدولة، لأن وجود مثل هذه الأسلحة خارج إطار الشرعية يغذي الانقسامات ويؤدي إلى تصاعد الأزمات والتنازلات.
منى الدحداح
واقع حزب الله وأثر سلاحه على لبنان..!
22 أغسطس 2025 - 00:02
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آخر تحديث 22 أغسطس 2025 - 00:02
تابع قناة عكاظ على الواتساب
In Lebanon, the issue of weapons has been a central topic of ongoing debate amidst the successive crises that have struck the country over the past decades. It is assumed that weapons are used to protect the homeland and defend its sovereignty, but the saying, "the weapon is the enemy of its owner," carries a painful truth, especially when we reflect on the experience of Hezbollah and its weapons in the Lebanese reality.
Hezbollah raises the banner of possessing a massive military arsenal that, according to official statements, aims to protect Lebanon from external threats, especially from Israel. However, the facts have proven the limitations of this weapon even in protecting the party's own leaders. The Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and several senior leaders of the party have faced repeated targeting attempts and threats, and this security arsenal has not been able to fully repel them as claimed. Whether through direct assaults or military strikes, experiences have shown that this weapon has not prevented violations against the party's leaders and their supportive environment.
From here, the central question emerges: If this weapon fails to protect those who manage and represent it, how can we trust its ability to protect the Lebanese people in all its components and defend Lebanon as a state? The reality is that Lebanon's reliance on this weapon as a security guarantee has contributed to deepening internal divisions and increasing and complicating the circle of conflicts and crises, rather than creating a sense of security and unity.
Regarding the occupied Lebanese territories, such as the Shebaa Farms and the Kfarshouba Hills, there has never been a day when this weapon was used to liberate these areas that Lebanon considers occupied.
Moreover, the Gaza support war that Hezbollah engaged in led to the occupation of 5 new hills by Israel within Lebanese territory along the Blue Line, namely the Hammass Hill, the Nabi Oweida Hill, Jabal Balat, Al-Labouna, and Al-Aziya. This raises serious questions about the effectiveness of this weapon and its true role in protecting the Lebanese and defending the sovereignty of their homeland.
As for the maritime file, a clear concession has emerged from Hezbollah regarding the Karish oil field. In the negotiations, Lebanon accepted the demarcation of maritime borders according to line 23 instead of line 29, which is recognized by the United Nations, a line that grants Lebanon more rights in this gas-rich field. This concession allowed Israel to have full control over the Karish field, while Lebanon obtained the Qana field, which requires Israeli approval for extracting its resources according to international agreements. This indicator reflects a clear retreat from previous positions that emphasized protecting Lebanese rights without concessions.
Despite the repeated threats issued by Hezbollah to strike Israeli facilities in the Karish field during periods of tension, these threats did not prevent Israel from continuing its drilling and production, highlighting the limited capacity of this weapon to protect Lebanon's sovereignty, its territory, and its national interests.
If the weapon that is declared as a tool for protecting Lebanon is incapable of liberating its occupied territories, fails to safeguard its sovereign rights, and does not prevent concessions that strip part of its wealth in favor of the enemy, how can it be a guarantee for the protection of all Lebanese?
Based on this reality, it has become clear that this weapon not only fails to protect its owner but has effectively become "the enemy of its owner" and "the enemy of the homeland" and its citizens. Therefore, Hezbollah must hand over its weapons to the Lebanese Army before the end of this year, as the Lebanese government has officially demanded based on the Taif Agreement and the ministerial statement.
The Lebanese state alone bears the exclusive responsibility for protecting Lebanon and its security, and it must be the only entity that possesses weapons, away from any tools or militias outside the framework of the state, because the existence of such weapons outside the framework of legitimacy fuels divisions and leads to the escalation of crises and concessions.
Hezbollah raises the banner of possessing a massive military arsenal that, according to official statements, aims to protect Lebanon from external threats, especially from Israel. However, the facts have proven the limitations of this weapon even in protecting the party's own leaders. The Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and several senior leaders of the party have faced repeated targeting attempts and threats, and this security arsenal has not been able to fully repel them as claimed. Whether through direct assaults or military strikes, experiences have shown that this weapon has not prevented violations against the party's leaders and their supportive environment.
From here, the central question emerges: If this weapon fails to protect those who manage and represent it, how can we trust its ability to protect the Lebanese people in all its components and defend Lebanon as a state? The reality is that Lebanon's reliance on this weapon as a security guarantee has contributed to deepening internal divisions and increasing and complicating the circle of conflicts and crises, rather than creating a sense of security and unity.
Regarding the occupied Lebanese territories, such as the Shebaa Farms and the Kfarshouba Hills, there has never been a day when this weapon was used to liberate these areas that Lebanon considers occupied.
Moreover, the Gaza support war that Hezbollah engaged in led to the occupation of 5 new hills by Israel within Lebanese territory along the Blue Line, namely the Hammass Hill, the Nabi Oweida Hill, Jabal Balat, Al-Labouna, and Al-Aziya. This raises serious questions about the effectiveness of this weapon and its true role in protecting the Lebanese and defending the sovereignty of their homeland.
As for the maritime file, a clear concession has emerged from Hezbollah regarding the Karish oil field. In the negotiations, Lebanon accepted the demarcation of maritime borders according to line 23 instead of line 29, which is recognized by the United Nations, a line that grants Lebanon more rights in this gas-rich field. This concession allowed Israel to have full control over the Karish field, while Lebanon obtained the Qana field, which requires Israeli approval for extracting its resources according to international agreements. This indicator reflects a clear retreat from previous positions that emphasized protecting Lebanese rights without concessions.
Despite the repeated threats issued by Hezbollah to strike Israeli facilities in the Karish field during periods of tension, these threats did not prevent Israel from continuing its drilling and production, highlighting the limited capacity of this weapon to protect Lebanon's sovereignty, its territory, and its national interests.
If the weapon that is declared as a tool for protecting Lebanon is incapable of liberating its occupied territories, fails to safeguard its sovereign rights, and does not prevent concessions that strip part of its wealth in favor of the enemy, how can it be a guarantee for the protection of all Lebanese?
Based on this reality, it has become clear that this weapon not only fails to protect its owner but has effectively become "the enemy of its owner" and "the enemy of the homeland" and its citizens. Therefore, Hezbollah must hand over its weapons to the Lebanese Army before the end of this year, as the Lebanese government has officially demanded based on the Taif Agreement and the ministerial statement.
The Lebanese state alone bears the exclusive responsibility for protecting Lebanon and its security, and it must be the only entity that possesses weapons, away from any tools or militias outside the framework of the state, because the existence of such weapons outside the framework of legitimacy fuels divisions and leads to the escalation of crises and concessions.


