الدروس المستفادة من الحروب الحالية

Since the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have embarked on a wide-ranging developmental journey, despite the crises and challenges the region has witnessed. Over more than three decades, these countries have invested in developing infrastructure, building human capacity, and diversifying the economy, until their cities, ports, airports, and institutions became models of progress and influential centers in the global economy.

However, the current wars have raised a fundamental question: How do we protect these achievements in a region where development projects compete with projects of influence and hegemony?

In my opinion, the Iranian project has shown a clear imbalance in prioritization; it has given significant space to expanding regional influence and building military capabilities, relying on support for armed groups beyond its borders, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen and armed factions in Iraq. This approach has contributed to weakening the institutions of those countries, deepening divisions, and leaving the region vulnerable to crises that drain its resources and hinder its development.

Conversely, the scene cannot be viewed in isolation from Israeli policies aimed at enhancing military superiority and expanding freedom of movement in the region. The Iranian nuclear file has taken a central position in the convergence of American and Israeli positions; Iranian enrichment has reached levels of up to 60%, a level that raises serious concerns, but it does not in itself mean possessing a complete nuclear weapon. It is essential to distinguish between possessing materials and technical capabilities and the actual manufacturing of a bomb.

As the war has expanded, maritime corridors have emerged as one of the most dangerous pressure points. The Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are not just geographical locations; they are lifelines for energy, trade, and supply chains. Disruptions in navigation in Hormuz have revealed that threats to ships can impose significant global costs, even without completely and continuously closing the strait.

In Yemen, coinciding with rising tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, the Iran-backed Houthi militia intensified its movements westward toward the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Indeed, by employing a strategy of massing forces, the militias were able to occupy some areas until they reached Bab el-Mandeb and the island of Meon. Subsequently, the Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi, announced the launch of "Operation Yemen Dawn" to restore state institutions, liberate the capital Sana'a, and end the Houthi coup. Government forces announced the recovery of strategic positions in Dhubab and the surrounding area of Bab el-Mandeb, in developments that confirm the centrality of the western coast to the security of Yemen and the region.

Recently, Houthi attacks have extended to civilian facilities in the Kingdom, including the cities of the Two Holy Mosques and the electricity distribution station in Medina, which provides services to the Prophet's Mosque and important civilian sites such as airports and vital resources. These highly dangerous attacks, which have resulted in many civilian casualties, as well as the guests of the Merciful from the Umrah pilgrims, necessitate the protection of the Kingdom and its resources, and support for the Yemeni state in confronting the threat posed by the armed group’s militias.

From these developments, several lessons can be drawn.

First: Development needs a protective force.

The Gulf countries have succeeded in building modern economies, but protecting these economies requires continued investment in defense, drones, early warning systems, cybersecurity, and protecting vital facilities. Security and development are complementary pillars; the more extensive the achievements, the greater the responsibility to secure them.

Second: Gulf security is a shared responsibility.

What affects one member state of the council impacts the others, whether in trade, investment, energy, or market confidence. Hence, there is a need for deeper integration, activating collective defense, information sharing, air and maritime defense, emergency planning, and transforming the concept of collective security into a sustainable operational capability.

Third: The presence of weapons outside state authority hinders stability.

The existence of armed groups that possess the decision of war and peace, and link their choices to external calculations, makes political settlements fragile. Therefore, restoring the Yemeni state must mean restoring its institutions, sovereignty, and monopoly on weapons, alongside building a national partnership that includes Yemenis and protects their rights.

Fourth: Protecting navigation begins with the stability of the coastal states.

Maritime presence is essential to secure the corridors, but it requires states capable of controlling their coasts and preventing their use to threaten ships. From this standpoint, supporting the stability of Yemen and its institutions serves the security of the Arabian Peninsula and international trade alike.

Fifth: Diversifying economic outlets is a strategic necessity.

The war emphasizes the importance of developing ports, pipelines as an alternative for oil transport, land connections, railways, and strategic storage. The flexibility of the economy is measured by its ability to continue functioning when a road, port, or supply source is disrupted.

Sixth: International partnerships are strengthened by self-capacity.

Alliances remain important, but they are more effective when based on national defense industries, qualified human competencies, and the ability to maintain, supply, and make decisions. A balanced reliance on partners gives states a broader space to protect their interests.

Seventh: Military success requires a political horizon.

Restoring territory must be followed by restoring services, reforming institutions, improving people's livelihoods, and protecting civilians. In Yemen specifically, military operations should be coupled with a clear plan for economic recovery, (in which the Saudi Program for Development and Reconstruction of Yemen plays a pivotal role), and national reconciliation, so that the stability of the state becomes a reality felt by the citizen.

Eighth: The credibility of discourse is part of crisis management.

In wars, confirmed news intertwines with claims and propaganda. Therefore, the accuracy of data, the speed of clarifying facts, and the distinction between news and analysis enhance trust and prevent rumors from influencing decisions and public opinion.

The Gulf experience has proven that building human capacity and institutions is the most effective path to creating a stable future. The current war confirms that protecting this path requires vigilance, strength, and solidarity, alongside diplomacy capable of containing crises and opening doors for settlement.

What is required today is to transform the lessons of war into permanent policies: more integrated Gulf security, a more resilient economy, and Arab states that restore their institutions and sovereignty, so that the decision regarding the future of the region remains in the hands of its peoples and states.