من يواجه الحوثي؟

There is a question that Yemen cannot avoid, and the international community cannot evade for long: When does confronting the militia become an international responsibility, and when does it remain a matter for the affected state and its neighbors?

The answer is not found solely in United Nations charters, nor in diplomatic statements. The answer, often, begins when the fire approaches interests.

For years, Yemen has been sinking into its war. A state eroding, a militia expanding, cities paying the price, while the world watches from afar. The crisis was managed through truces, negotiations, and mediations, as if the goal was to prevent a big explosion, not to address its causes. But everything changed when the war reached the Red Sea.

When commercial ships began to be endangered, navigation turned into security calculations, and the costs of insurance and shipping rose, the Houthis were no longer just a party in a Yemeni war. Suddenly, the issue became linked to global trade security, supply chains, energy, and the interests of major economies.

We remember in late 2023, the formation of the "Guardian of Prosperity" coalition, followed by American and British strikes against Houthi positions. Here, the reality of international politics emerged without much embellishment.

The suffering of Yemenis was not new when the fleets moved. What was new was that the danger began to threaten ships carrying the world's goods. And this is not unique to Yemen alone. When ISIS expanded in Iraq and Syria, threatened energy sources, and its danger exceeded the region's borders, a broad international coalition was formed to confront it. In other crises far from trade routes, energy sources, and the interests of major powers, international intervention remained slower and less decisive.

The problem, then, is not only in international law. It is also in the arrangement of interests within the international system. The Houthis represent a more complex case than a traditional armed group. They are a force that controls a vast geography, possesses ballistic missiles and drones, manages institutions, weapons, and ports, and has the ability to influence one of the most sensitive maritime corridors in the world.

Here, the definition of the problem changes. We are no longer facing a cell that can be dismantled through a security operation, but rather an armed entity that possesses some state tools without being a state. Therefore, confronting them cannot be reduced to an airstrike or a temporary political deal. The problem is not just in the missile itself, but in the environment that allows for the production of the missile, its launch, and the re-production of the ability to launch it.

As for the cost, it has moved from Yemen to the world. Hundreds of ships changed their course to the Cape of Good Hope, transportation and insurance costs rose, and shipping schedules were disrupted. Thus, an armed group transformed into a factor affecting trade movement between Asia and Europe. Here, specifically, the importance of the Red Sea emerges. If safety disappears, the route changes. But this change does not eliminate the bill. It is paid by shipping companies, then markets, and finally the consumer.

Regionally, the picture is clearer. Iran has built over the years a network of regional influence with multiple tools, of which the Houthis are an important component. For Tehran, the presence of an allied force at this geographical location is a leverage in a conflict broader than Yemen's borders.

As for Saudi Arabia, it treats Yemen as part of its direct security, not as a regular foreign file. Egypt has a different calculation, but it is no less direct, named the Suez Canal. Any disruption in the Red Sea quickly turns into a problem that exceeds the borders of the Egyptian state.

Here, the issue returns to its origin. Why does danger only become an international issue when it touches international interests?

The answer may be uncomfortable, but it is simple; because states act according to calculations of security and interest before they act according to considerations of solidarity. This does not mean that international law is without value, but it means that law alone does not make international politics. Power, interest, economy, and geography all play a role in decision-making.

From here, the greatest mistake is believing that the militia will remain a local problem forever. The militia begins within a state, then expands within its void, then builds a parallel force, and then discovers that geography grants it influence that exceeds its borders. When it reaches ports and maritime corridors, the problem is no longer confined to the state from which it emerged.

This is the story of the Houthis today. It has become a test of how the world deals with armed entities that grow within states and then transform into a force capable of disrupting trade routes and threatening regional security. History tells us that fire does not need a passport. It may start in the neighbor's house, but only the wind decides where it goes.