تجتمع إيران ودول الترويكا الأوروبية (بريطانيا وفرنسا وألمانيا) على دفن آخر ما تبقى من إرث أوباما وهو الاتفاق النووي أو مجموعة العمل الشاملة (JCPOA)، وذلك عبر تفعيل آلية السناب باك مما يعني إعادة فرض العقوبات الأممية على إيران، بحسب قرار مجلس الأمن 2231 للعام 2015.
ومن جانبها وبحسب تصريحات برلمانية إيرانية، تدرس طهران الانسحاب الكلي من الاتفاقية النووية، مما يعني تحرير برنامجها النووي من أي قيود على مستوى نسبة تخصيب اليورانيوم، كمية اليورانيوم أو حتى عدد أجهزة الطرد المركزي.
البرنامج النووي الإيراني والذي انطلق في عهد الشاه محمد رضا بهلوي في العام 1957، عبر توقيع اتفاقية «الذرة من أجل السلام» في عهد الرئيس إيزنهاور، مر بعدة مراحل في العلاقة بالأوروبيين تحديداً، وذلك بدءاً من العام 1974 حين وقّعت إيران عقوداً مع فرنسا وألمانيا الغربية لبناء عشرين مفاعلاً للطاقة النووية.
المرحلة الأولى للأوروبيين كوسيط ومفاوض وجسر بين الإيرانيين والأمريكان، بدأت مع كشف المعارضة الإيرانية معلومات عن منشأة نطنز للتخصيب ومنشأة آراك للماء الثقيل، مما يعني أن إيران لم تتوقف عند منشأة بوشهر لإنتاج الطاقة الكهربائية، حينها أثار ما نشرته المعارضة قلقاً أوروبياً خاصة في عواصم الترويكا.
هذا القلق لم يكن محصوراً بالخشية من تطوير إيران لسلاح نووي فقط، بل كان الخشية وربما بشكل أكبر من ردة فعل الرئيس بوش الابن والذي كان يعبّر عن مصطلح محور الشر، وكان الحديث آنذاك في 2002 حثيثاً حول غزو العراق، لذا قرر الأوروبيون السير بمسار للمفاوضات يجنّب إيران مصير العراق.
توّجت هذه الجهود في أكتوبر 2003 حين سافر وزراء خارجية الدول الأوروبية الثلاث، دوفيلبان (فرنسا)، فيتشر (ألمانيا)، وسترو (بريطانيا) إلى إيران وأقنعوا المسؤولين بتوقيع (إعلان طهران)، والذي شمل تعليقاً مؤقتاً لتخصيب اليورانيوم، ومنح الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية مزيداً من صلاحيات التفتيش.
ظلت الأمور متأرجحة بين التزام كبير من طهران حتى 2004، ثم تصعيد بعد وصول أحمدي نجاد للسلطة في 2005، وصولاً إلى اتفاق 2015 حين عملوا كجسر رئيسي للاتفاق الذي وقع في فيينا، بل إنهم ذهبوا أبعد من ذلك بعد انسحاب الرئيس ترمب في فترته الأولى من الاتفاق في العام 2018، حيث حاول الأوروبيون تقديم آلية مالية بديلة عرفت بـ INSTEX لكنها فشلت على كل حال.
اليوم يأتي التصعيد من أوروبا عوضاً عن دورها المعتاد كمقرّب لوجهات النظر، وهو ما يراه عراقجي حسب تغريدة بأن الأوروبيين قاموا بإعادة تفعيل «آلية الزناد» عوضاً عن إسرائيل وأمريكا.
من جانبهم يعتبر الأوروبيون أن الإيرانيين ماضون في مشروعهم النووي، بغض النظر عن كون ذلك طموحاً نووياً أو تعزيزاً لأوراق تفاوض لطهران، وهم أيضاً يرون بأنهم منحوا طهران فرصة إلى نهاية أغسطس وأن الوقت يمضي سريعاً قبل فقدانهم القدرة على تفعيل العقوبات الأممية قبل 18 أكتوبر.
وأضاف الأوروبيون في تصريحاتهم أن قرارهم لا يجب أن يمثّل انهيار الدبلوماسية، وهذا يأخذني إلى كتاب محمد جواد ظريف، وزير الخارجية الإيراني الأسبق «صمود الدبلوماسية»، حيث يتناول السردية الأوروبية بشكل لافت، وكيف أن لديهم إنكاراً لتراجع دورهم، بالإضافة لمزايدتهم القيمية بشكل يتجاوز حتى واشنطن.
ومن المقاطع اللافتة قوله: «حتى انسحاب ترمب من الاتفاق النووي كان الأوروبيون متوهمين حول حدود تفاعلهم المستقل في التجارة والحوالات المالية والنقدية». ويضيف: «صحيح أن المحادثات المفتوحة المبنية على الأنانية الأوروبية يلقون فيها اللوم على واشنطن وطهران، لكنهم في المحادثات الخاصة يقرون بأن واشنطن تسيطر على الشركات الأوروبية أكثر من بروكسل».
وهنا يجب النظر للموقف الأوروبي بشكل أشمل، فالأوروبيون الذين شعروا بالقلق من قمة ألاسكا بين بوتين وترمب، خشية أن ينتج اتفاقاً في أوكرانيا بمعزل عنهم، وما سبق ذلك من إدراك أوروبي في 2022 بأنهم لا يستطيعون التصدي لروسيا دون أمريكا، وصولاً إلى الاتفاق التجاري الأوروبي مع أمريكا والذي وصفه رئيس وزراء فرنسا بأنه يمثّل «يوماً كئيباً».
قد يعني التصعيد وتفعيل آلية السناب باك في أحد جوانبه تموضعاً أوروبياً جديداً، في علاقتها مع واشنطن قبل علاقتها مع طهران.
تابع قناة عكاظ على الواتساب
Iran and the European troika countries (Britain, France, and Germany) are united in burying the last remnants of Obama's legacy, which is the nuclear agreement or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), by activating the snapback mechanism, meaning the re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran, according to UN Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015.
On its part, and according to statements from Iranian parliamentary officials, Tehran is considering a complete withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, which means freeing its nuclear program from any restrictions regarding uranium enrichment levels, the quantity of uranium, or even the number of centrifuges.
The Iranian nuclear program, which began during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1957, through the signing of the "Atoms for Peace" agreement during President Eisenhower's era, has gone through several phases in its relationship with Europeans specifically, starting in 1974 when Iran signed contracts with France and West Germany to build twenty nuclear power reactors.
The first phase for the Europeans as a mediator and negotiator and bridge between the Iranians and Americans began with the Iranian opposition revealing information about the Natanz enrichment facility and the Arak heavy water facility, indicating that Iran did not stop at the Bushehr facility for electricity generation. At that time, what the opposition published raised European concerns, especially in the capitals of the troika.
This concern was not limited to fears of Iran developing a nuclear weapon only, but there was also a greater fear of the reaction of President George W. Bush, who expressed the term "Axis of Evil," and discussions at that time in 2002 were intensifying about invading Iraq. Therefore, the Europeans decided to pursue a negotiation path that would spare Iran the fate of Iraq.
These efforts culminated in October 2003 when the foreign ministers of the three European countries, Dominique de Villepin (France), Joschka Fischer (Germany), and Jack Straw (Britain), traveled to Iran and convinced officials to sign the "Tehran Declaration," which included a temporary suspension of uranium enrichment and granted the International Atomic Energy Agency more inspection powers.
Things remained fluctuating between significant commitment from Tehran until 2004, then escalated after Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, leading to the 2015 agreement when they acted as a main bridge for the agreement signed in Vienna. They even went further after President Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018, where the Europeans attempted to provide an alternative financial mechanism known as INSTEX, but it ultimately failed.
Today, the escalation comes from Europe instead of its usual role as a closer mediator of viewpoints, which is what Araghchi sees in a tweet, stating that the Europeans have reactivated the "trigger mechanism" instead of Israel and the U.S.
For their part, the Europeans believe that the Iranians are moving forward with their nuclear project, regardless of whether this is a nuclear ambition or a strengthening of Tehran's negotiation cards. They also see that they gave Tehran a chance until the end of August and that time is running out before they lose the ability to activate UN sanctions before October 18.
The Europeans added in their statements that their decision should not represent the collapse of diplomacy, which takes me to the book by Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Iranian foreign minister, "The Resilience of Diplomacy," where he notably addresses the European narrative and how they have a denial of the decline of their role, in addition to their value posturing that even surpasses Washington.
One striking excerpt is his statement: "Even after Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, the Europeans were deluded about the limits of their independent interaction in trade and financial transactions." He adds: "It is true that in open discussions based on European selfishness, they blame Washington and Tehran, but in private discussions, they admit that Washington controls European companies more than Brussels does."
Here, the European position should be viewed more comprehensively, as the Europeans who felt anxious about the Alaska summit between Putin and Trump, fearing that it would result in an agreement in Ukraine without them, and the prior European realization in 2022 that they could not confront Russia without America, leading to the European trade agreement with America, which the French Prime Minister described as representing "a gloomy day."
The escalation and activation of the snapback mechanism may, in one aspect, signify a new European positioning in its relationship with Washington before its relationship with Tehran.
On its part, and according to statements from Iranian parliamentary officials, Tehran is considering a complete withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, which means freeing its nuclear program from any restrictions regarding uranium enrichment levels, the quantity of uranium, or even the number of centrifuges.
The Iranian nuclear program, which began during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1957, through the signing of the "Atoms for Peace" agreement during President Eisenhower's era, has gone through several phases in its relationship with Europeans specifically, starting in 1974 when Iran signed contracts with France and West Germany to build twenty nuclear power reactors.
The first phase for the Europeans as a mediator and negotiator and bridge between the Iranians and Americans began with the Iranian opposition revealing information about the Natanz enrichment facility and the Arak heavy water facility, indicating that Iran did not stop at the Bushehr facility for electricity generation. At that time, what the opposition published raised European concerns, especially in the capitals of the troika.
This concern was not limited to fears of Iran developing a nuclear weapon only, but there was also a greater fear of the reaction of President George W. Bush, who expressed the term "Axis of Evil," and discussions at that time in 2002 were intensifying about invading Iraq. Therefore, the Europeans decided to pursue a negotiation path that would spare Iran the fate of Iraq.
These efforts culminated in October 2003 when the foreign ministers of the three European countries, Dominique de Villepin (France), Joschka Fischer (Germany), and Jack Straw (Britain), traveled to Iran and convinced officials to sign the "Tehran Declaration," which included a temporary suspension of uranium enrichment and granted the International Atomic Energy Agency more inspection powers.
Things remained fluctuating between significant commitment from Tehran until 2004, then escalated after Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, leading to the 2015 agreement when they acted as a main bridge for the agreement signed in Vienna. They even went further after President Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018, where the Europeans attempted to provide an alternative financial mechanism known as INSTEX, but it ultimately failed.
Today, the escalation comes from Europe instead of its usual role as a closer mediator of viewpoints, which is what Araghchi sees in a tweet, stating that the Europeans have reactivated the "trigger mechanism" instead of Israel and the U.S.
For their part, the Europeans believe that the Iranians are moving forward with their nuclear project, regardless of whether this is a nuclear ambition or a strengthening of Tehran's negotiation cards. They also see that they gave Tehran a chance until the end of August and that time is running out before they lose the ability to activate UN sanctions before October 18.
The Europeans added in their statements that their decision should not represent the collapse of diplomacy, which takes me to the book by Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Iranian foreign minister, "The Resilience of Diplomacy," where he notably addresses the European narrative and how they have a denial of the decline of their role, in addition to their value posturing that even surpasses Washington.
One striking excerpt is his statement: "Even after Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, the Europeans were deluded about the limits of their independent interaction in trade and financial transactions." He adds: "It is true that in open discussions based on European selfishness, they blame Washington and Tehran, but in private discussions, they admit that Washington controls European companies more than Brussels does."
Here, the European position should be viewed more comprehensively, as the Europeans who felt anxious about the Alaska summit between Putin and Trump, fearing that it would result in an agreement in Ukraine without them, and the prior European realization in 2022 that they could not confront Russia without America, leading to the European trade agreement with America, which the French Prime Minister described as representing "a gloomy day."
The escalation and activation of the snapback mechanism may, in one aspect, signify a new European positioning in its relationship with Washington before its relationship with Tehran.
