لعبة الجبان

There are interconnected and complex cycles that describe American-Iranian relations from 1979 until the moment you are reading this article, a recurring cycle of coercion, adaptation, escalation, and stagnation. Even in the two most prominent milestones—the 2015 agreement and then the withdrawal from it, which is considered a continuous cycle of exit followed by the strikes of summer 2025—up to the current situation as of February 28, the cycle has continued but with a change in the nature of adaptation.

The sanctions opened the development of Tehran's "resistance economy," which is inherently centered on resisting sanctions, not Israel. Its three pillars, as noted by researcher at the Quincy Institute, Hadi Khalilzadeh, are evasion, localization, and diversification, with a belief in the existence of closed doors under sanctions in specific areas such as expanding the civil aviation fleet or utilizing foreign expertise in developing oil exploration operations.

Outside of sanctions, another framework of adaptation has formed, which saw manifestations during the period from 2015 to 2018, when doors were opened for the flow of money into Iran. Iran handed over enriched uranium with one hand and delivered dollar bags to Hezbollah and other arms, strengthening these arms to serve as an alternative deterrent to nuclear capabilities.

Today, questions arise under the title of lack of trust or a negotiating gap. If we look at the negotiation approach, the Iranian side, for example, formulated its vision for the memorandum of understanding based on zero trust. Thus, it placed obstacles at the beginning of the memorandum, such as the release of frozen funds first, as if to say, "Every time we negotiate, I am surprised by your military attacks." Therefore, the request for a commitment not to attack Iran again can be interpreted as "Give me my money first."

As for the negotiating gap, it does not exist, but it is more accurate to say, what is the existential nerve that each party feels in the other, which appears as a negotiating gap? The three American demands—nuclear, ballistic, and regional arms—are what constitutes achieving President Trump's goal of reaching a better agreement than President Obama's. However, for the Iranian negotiator, Gaddafi's voluntary surrender of his nuclear program was not received by the West as a goodwill gesture but as paving the way for the overthrow of his regime.

Even the Strait of Hormuz, which seems to be an urgent matter for Iran and a gain it does not want to concede at all, grants it control and the ability to economically influence Gulf countries. The shift from the military model of the region during the Shah's time to the military model of the strait today may seem like a highly noisy topic at the global level, but analyzing the Iranian negotiator's methodology, I believe it is a negotiating tactic to ensure that the final agreement comes without any restrictions on ballistic missiles as a primary deterrent for a country that does not possess advanced air power.

Historically, one of the tactics used by the Iranians has been to portray the idea of the bazaar and the carpet maker who can be patient until they achieve the best result from negotiations, enduring hardships in the process. Both parties today have prepared to show that they do not care about time. The U.S. has used deadlines as a pressure tool and has utilized negotiations with its hand on the dispute as another tool, along with the pressures we know from midterm elections and others.

However, Iran's patience today is more costly than ever. The economy is rapidly and dramatically deteriorating, and poverty rates have significantly doubled. Thus, patience is very costly internally, and any return to the blockade of Iranian ports again would represent a free fall into deeper lows. Therefore, what both sides are waving about their ability to be patient is not accurate for either.

Geometrically and with a conscious design not devoid of unconscious aspects, both parties are heading towards the natural middle ground of any negotiations—some gains here and some concessions there. The omission of issues related to missiles, proxies, and the settlement of Lebanon was a deliberate choice to secure immediate regional stability and to mature the memorandum of understanding. This is a design for the middle ground based on postponing what cannot be resolved and solidifying what can be solidified.

Both parties recognize that they are developing the form of negotiations to resemble the game of chicken, where two cars head towards each other at speed. The one that swerves off course is the coward, while the one that continues crashes into the other car, thus harming both parties.