بين الأمن الوطني والأمن القومي..!

Since the emergence of the modern nation-state at the end of the first half of the seventeenth century, following the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the obsession with security has been the primary source of concern for the state entity. This type of security anxiety primarily stems from the external environment of the state entity. This anxiety takes two main forms: the first is direct, and the second is indirect. The direct threat comes in the form of a direct invasion of the state entity, aimed at occupying it or perhaps stripping it of its national identity and sovereignty over its territory, and this external invasion may result in the disappearance of the state and the annihilation of its international existence. The indirect threat involves attempts to destabilize its internal security and its existing political system, which symbolizes its sovereignty and national dignity.

In any case, the state is apprehensive about an imminent and decisive threat to its national security and sovereign independence, defending its national entity and the independence of its sovereign decision-making. Even when the state attempts to enhance its (national) security; aiming to support it with a broader (national) security for greater defensive effectiveness, through participation in collective regional security entities, this regional defensive approach does not necessarily guarantee an effective security deterrent, especially if these national security entities do not extend beyond their written texts, which appear to be binding treaties, but in reality are not actionable due to a lack of effective collective political will, as is the case with the Arab Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty, under the umbrella of the Arab League, which was signed in Cairo on June 18, 1951. Thus, the fear continues to grow regarding the national security of the state, forming a pressing security obsession on its sovereign decision-making institutions.

Even under major defensive entities, as seen in transcontinental strategic alliances, the national security of member states in such major strategic alliances cannot be solely dependent on the defensive capabilities of the member states, especially if the supreme military leadership of those strategic alliances is entrusted to a specific international pole, as is the case with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), which was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, and the Warsaw Pact (Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance), led by the Soviet Union, which was signed in Warsaw, the capital of Poland, on May 14, 1955. This was during the Cold War era, which lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991, and prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact had fallen on July 1, 1991. However, the North Atlantic Treaty remained in effect until today, and its membership expanded to include countries in Eastern Europe that were part of the Warsaw Pact.

Even these major strategic alliances on a global level did not provide sufficient security for their members and did not relieve them of the security anxiety that troubled their decision-making institutions, in light of an international conflict governed by the equation of nuclear terror balance. In the Western bloc, some of its key members experienced a legitimate security anxiety regarding total reliance on the American nuclear umbrella, in the event that the prohibited occurred and the cold conflict escalated into the possibility of a hot conflict. Would the United States come to the aid of its allies in Europe, sacrificing its own security if it faced a conventional or unconventional attack from the Soviet Union? The prevailing belief at that time among major powers in Europe, such as Britain and France, during the Cold War, was that Washington would not sacrifice its own security to aid London and Paris if the Soviet Union attacked Europe, leading to their decision to possess their own nuclear deterrent. On the other side, the same security anxiety gripped China. This time, the security anxiety was doubled for Beijing regarding both Washington and Moscow, despite the strong ideological bond that connected the communist ideology comrades of the two neighboring giants (Russia and China). China, in turn, established its own nuclear deterrent, adhering to the saying: "No one can scratch your back like your own nail."

Finally, the national security sense prevailed over the illusion of collective (national) protection when Europe recently awakened to the United States' intention to abandon its security commitments to its European allies by the end of next year, as stated in the new U.S. security strategy paper (December 4, 2025), implementing President Trump's strategy under the slogans: America First.. and the return of the greatness of the United States once again.

In summary: there is no real security guarantee to rely on the umbrella of national security (regional or international), other than national security, despite the immense potential for integrative gains in economy, development, social prosperity, cultural progress, and cultural tolerance, in addition to the advantages of (national) security in collective mutual defense, where the latter remains (always) a possibility that does not rely on a genuine strategic dependency. Real security guarantees, from a strategic perspective, must first rely, before considering any alternative, on the actual power capabilities of the state, to achieve a (national) security that has a real effective and efficient dependency, not on the illusion of (national) security under the banner of collective mutual security.