حين تتفاوض جهة حكومية كانت أو شبه حكومية أو حتى خاصة مع طرف أمريكي، فإنها غالباً لا تدرك أنها أصبحت طرفاً في معادلة قانونية لا تشبه كثيراً البيئة التعاقدية المحلية. فالمسألة لا تقف عند تسعير الخدمة أو تقديم العرض الأنسب، بل تمتد إلى ما هو أبعد من ذلك: المصداقية المعلوماتية كعنصر قانوني جوهري.
في القانون الفيدرالي الأمريكي، وتحديداً في العقود التي تتعلق بالحكومة أو وزارة الدفاع، لا يُنظر إلى التفاوض على أنه ساحة لإبراز المهارة فقط، بل هو اختبار للنية، ولسلامة الإفصاح، بل وللقيم المؤسسية التي يحملها الطرف الآخر. ومن هنا نشأ ما يُعرف بقانون Truth in Negotiations Act أو TINA، وهو نظام يلزم الشركات المتقدمة بعطاءات مع الحكومة الأمريكية بالكشف الكامل عن جميع المعلومات الواقعية المتعلقة بالتسعير والتكلفة وقت التفاوض.
اللافت أن هذا الإفصاح ليس اختيارياً، ولا حتى ضمن ما يُطلب عادةً في وثائق العطاء. بل هو إفصاح مفروض قانونًا، والإخلال به حتى لو بحسن نية قد يؤدي إلى إعادة التفاوض القسري في السعر، أو استرداد المبالغ، أو حتى التحقيق والمساءلة الجنائية، فضلًا عن الشطب من السجل الفيدرالي كمورد مؤهل.
هذا النموذج من الصرامة التعاقدية يُعيد تعريف معنى الاحتراف بالنسبة للشركات السعودية التي تدخل بقوة اليوم إلى ساحة العقود الدولية، لا سيما مع اتساع الطموح الوطني المرتبط برؤية 2030، حيث باتت المملكة لاعبًا مركزيًا في ملفات حسّاسة تتعلق بالدفاع، والتقنية، والبنية السيادية للدولة. وهو ما يفرض على الجهات السعودية ألا تدخل في هذه العقود بمنطق التاجر الحاذق أو المقاول المجتهد، بل بمنطق الشريك الواعي بالقوانين العابرة للحدود.
إن ما يجعل TINA قانوناً غير مألوف في السياق المحلي، هو أنه يُحمّل الشركة مسؤولية الإفصاح، حتى في غياب طلب صريح من الطرف الآخر. فالمعلومة التي لم تُطلب لكنها جوهرية، تصبح بموجب هذا القانون واجبًا قانونياً لا يمكن إخفاؤه، وإلا عُدّ ذلك تدليساً.
وربما يكون من المفيد التوقف عند هذا المعنى: أن النظام القانوني الأمريكي لا يُراهن على النية، بل على البينة. ولا يعترف كثيرًا بمبدأ «افترضنا أنه معروف»، بل يُحمّل الطرف الآخر مسؤولية كل ما لم يُقل، وكان يجب أن يُقال. وهذه فلسفة تُخالف في جوهرها كثيراً من أنماط التفاوض الشائعة في البيئة الخليجية، حيث لا يزال البعض يرى أن الإفصاح الزائد يُضعف مركزه التفاوضي، أو أن «السكوت» يمكن تأويله لصالحه.
في المقابل، يعكس TINA فلسفة قائمة على أن المال العام الأمريكي ليس محلاً للتفاوض، بل للحماية. وأن الشفافية في التفاوض ليست قيمة أخلاقية مستحبة، بل قيد قانوني نافذ.
من هنا، فإن أي جهة سعودية تنوي الدخول في علاقة تعاقدية مع طرف أمريكي خاصة إذا كانت العلاقة تنطوي على مكوّن دفاعي أو لوجستي أو تكنولوجي يجب أن تُعيد صياغة منظومة العمل من الداخل، سواء من حيث نماذج التسعير، أو حفظ الأدلة، أو أساليب التوثيق، أو أسلوب الكتابة نفسه. فهذه البيئات القانونية لا تغفر لمن يُخطئ، ولا تُقدّر كثيرًا منطق الاجتهاد النابع من حسن النية.
ليست القضية أن نُخضع أعمالنا بالكامل لمنطق TINA، بل أن نُدرك أن هذه القواعد موجودة، وأنها تطبَّق، وأن تجاهلها لا يعفي من تبعاتها. وحين تسعى الدولة لتعزيز وجودها في الأسواق العالمية، فلا بد أن تتماهى اللغة التعاقدية للشركات السعودية مع هذه المعايير، دون أن تفقد هويتها، ودون أن تفرّط في السيادة، ولكن أيضًا دون أن تجهل ما قد يُحمّلها أعباء لا تعلم من أين جاءت.
فما تراه تفاصيل محاسبية، قد يراه الطرف المقابل مخالفة فيدرالية.
وما تراه مهارة تفاوضية، قد يُنظر إليه هناك كـ«تضليل متعمد».
وحين تصل الأمور إلى هذه الدرجة من الدقة، فإن أول ما يجب أن نتعلّمه على الأقل هو أن الصدق، في بعض البيئات التعاقدية، ليس فقط فضيلة... بل قانون له تبعاته سلباً وإيجاباً.
تابع قناة عكاظ على الواتساب
When a government, quasi-government, or even private entity negotiates with an American party, it often does not realize that it has become a part of a legal equation that is quite different from the local contractual environment. The issue does not stop at pricing the service or presenting the best offer; it extends further: informational credibility as a fundamental legal element.
In U.S. federal law, specifically in contracts related to the government or the Department of Defense, negotiation is not viewed merely as a platform to showcase skill; it is a test of intent, of the integrity of disclosure, and of the institutional values held by the other party. This gave rise to what is known as the Truth in Negotiations Act, or TINA, a system that requires companies bidding for contracts with the U.S. government to fully disclose all factual information related to pricing and costs at the time of negotiation.
Notably, this disclosure is not optional, nor is it typically included in the documents requested in the bidding process. Rather, it is a legally mandated disclosure, and a breach of it, even in good faith, may lead to forced renegotiation of the price, recovery of amounts, or even investigation and criminal accountability, in addition to being removed from the federal register as a qualified supplier.
This model of contractual rigor redefines the meaning of professionalism for Saudi companies that are strongly entering the international contracting arena today, especially with the expanding national ambition linked to Vision 2030, where the Kingdom has become a central player in sensitive files related to defense, technology, and the sovereign infrastructure of the state. This requires Saudi entities to enter into these contracts not with the mindset of a shrewd trader or diligent contractor, but with the mindset of a partner aware of cross-border laws.
What makes TINA an unusual law in the local context is that it places the responsibility of disclosure on the company, even in the absence of an explicit request from the other party. Information that has not been requested but is essential becomes, under this law, a legal obligation that cannot be concealed; otherwise, it is considered misrepresentation.
It may be useful to pause at this meaning: the American legal system does not rely on intent but on evidence. It does not often recognize the principle of "we assumed it was known," but rather places the responsibility on the other party for everything that was not said but should have been said. This philosophy fundamentally contradicts many common negotiation patterns in the Gulf environment, where some still believe that excessive disclosure weakens their negotiating position, or that "silence" can be interpreted in their favor.
In contrast, TINA reflects a philosophy based on the notion that American public money is not a subject for negotiation but for protection. Transparency in negotiation is not merely a desirable moral value but a binding legal constraint.
Therefore, any Saudi entity intending to enter into a contractual relationship with an American party, especially if the relationship involves a defense, logistical, or technological component, must reframe its internal working system, whether in terms of pricing models, evidence preservation, documentation methods, or even the writing style itself. These legal environments do not forgive those who err, nor do they greatly appreciate the reasoning of diligence stemming from good intentions.
The issue is not to fully subject our operations to the logic of TINA, but to recognize that these rules exist, that they are applied, and that ignoring them does not exempt one from their consequences. When the state seeks to enhance its presence in global markets, the contractual language of Saudi companies must align with these standards, without losing their identity, without compromising sovereignty, but also without being unaware of what may impose burdens they do not know the source of.
What you see as accounting details may be seen by the other party as a federal violation.
What you view as a negotiation skill may be regarded there as "intentional misrepresentation."
When matters reach this level of precision, the first thing we must learn, at the very least, is that honesty, in some contractual environments, is not just a virtue... but a law with its own positive and negative consequences.
In U.S. federal law, specifically in contracts related to the government or the Department of Defense, negotiation is not viewed merely as a platform to showcase skill; it is a test of intent, of the integrity of disclosure, and of the institutional values held by the other party. This gave rise to what is known as the Truth in Negotiations Act, or TINA, a system that requires companies bidding for contracts with the U.S. government to fully disclose all factual information related to pricing and costs at the time of negotiation.
Notably, this disclosure is not optional, nor is it typically included in the documents requested in the bidding process. Rather, it is a legally mandated disclosure, and a breach of it, even in good faith, may lead to forced renegotiation of the price, recovery of amounts, or even investigation and criminal accountability, in addition to being removed from the federal register as a qualified supplier.
This model of contractual rigor redefines the meaning of professionalism for Saudi companies that are strongly entering the international contracting arena today, especially with the expanding national ambition linked to Vision 2030, where the Kingdom has become a central player in sensitive files related to defense, technology, and the sovereign infrastructure of the state. This requires Saudi entities to enter into these contracts not with the mindset of a shrewd trader or diligent contractor, but with the mindset of a partner aware of cross-border laws.
What makes TINA an unusual law in the local context is that it places the responsibility of disclosure on the company, even in the absence of an explicit request from the other party. Information that has not been requested but is essential becomes, under this law, a legal obligation that cannot be concealed; otherwise, it is considered misrepresentation.
It may be useful to pause at this meaning: the American legal system does not rely on intent but on evidence. It does not often recognize the principle of "we assumed it was known," but rather places the responsibility on the other party for everything that was not said but should have been said. This philosophy fundamentally contradicts many common negotiation patterns in the Gulf environment, where some still believe that excessive disclosure weakens their negotiating position, or that "silence" can be interpreted in their favor.
In contrast, TINA reflects a philosophy based on the notion that American public money is not a subject for negotiation but for protection. Transparency in negotiation is not merely a desirable moral value but a binding legal constraint.
Therefore, any Saudi entity intending to enter into a contractual relationship with an American party, especially if the relationship involves a defense, logistical, or technological component, must reframe its internal working system, whether in terms of pricing models, evidence preservation, documentation methods, or even the writing style itself. These legal environments do not forgive those who err, nor do they greatly appreciate the reasoning of diligence stemming from good intentions.
The issue is not to fully subject our operations to the logic of TINA, but to recognize that these rules exist, that they are applied, and that ignoring them does not exempt one from their consequences. When the state seeks to enhance its presence in global markets, the contractual language of Saudi companies must align with these standards, without losing their identity, without compromising sovereignty, but also without being unaware of what may impose burdens they do not know the source of.
What you see as accounting details may be seen by the other party as a federal violation.
What you view as a negotiation skill may be regarded there as "intentional misrepresentation."
When matters reach this level of precision, the first thing we must learn, at the very least, is that honesty, in some contractual environments, is not just a virtue... but a law with its own positive and negative consequences.


