تفكير العقل الحوثي تحت الضغط

Since the Houthis took control of Sana'a more than a decade ago, a large part of their calculations has been built on a specific idea: their opponents will tire before they do, the region will change, and Iran will remain capable of providing enough support to keep them in a bargaining position, not a defeated one.

However, Yemen is now entering a different phase. The resumption of fighting, the expansion of military pressure, and the shrinking of Iranian maneuverability all raise a question beyond the question of the battle itself: how does the Houthi think when their back is less broad than it was?

Recent indicators suggest that the group is trying to compensate for the retreat of Iranian depth by expanding the value of its own cards. Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea, and the threat to Saudi and international interests have become bargaining chips that the Houthis want to make costly to relinquish.

Perhaps here lies the crux of the conflict. The issue seems to be that the militia is trying to raise the cost of its defeat to a level that makes its opponents consider negotiating with it instead of eradicating it. The higher the cost of war, the higher, in their calculations, the value of a seat at the negotiating table.

But Yemeni history tells a different story. Over seven decades, the weapon has proven its ability to impose an agreement, but it has not proven its ability to build a state. Since the establishment of the republic, through the wars following unification and major political transformations, up to the 2022 truce, agreements have tended to address the balance of power more than the issue of statehood. Even the national dialogue, which ended with a vision for a federal state of six regions, did not resolve the issue of the south or the dilemma of power and wealth distribution. Then the fall of Sana'a to the Houthis toppled the entire transitional phase and opened the door to a new war, followed by a series of truces. What has repeatedly been proven is that de-escalation is possible, while turning truces into a comprehensive political settlement is another matter. Today, the fragility of the equation seems more apparent with the expansion of the fighting.

In the region, there are other experiences worth contemplating, despite the differences in geography, identities, and circumstances. The Taif Agreement ended the Lebanese war because it shifted the essence of the conflict from the battlefield to political participation, but over time, it left imbalances in the structure of the state when the weapon remained outside its complete monopoly. In Iraq, the experience showed that arranging the sharing of influence and integrating armed forces into the political system is not enough if the security decision remains distributed between the state and other forces. In Syria, years of negotiation have shown that a ceasefire, without resolving the question of the future of power, can turn into just a pause between two battles.

The Houthis are well aware of these experiences. Therefore, it is difficult for them to envision a peace that returns them to the caves of Saada. They may want to solidify their position created by the war; political recognition of the size of their military strength, economic guarantees that allow their group to survive, a security arrangement that preserves their influence, and perhaps a degree of independence from the center in Sana'a.

However, on the other hand, the Kingdom cannot view a Yemen that turns into a missile platform or an Iranian arm on its borders as an acceptable settlement. And Iran, even under pressure, does not easily relinquish a card through which it has gained a foothold on one of the most important maritime corridors in the world. Nevertheless, Iranian influence in Yemen and the Red Sea is not an eternal fate. When the cost of supporting the group becomes higher than the political and strategic returns it achieves, the Houthi may find himself facing the necessity of redefining his relationship with Iran. Not necessarily cutting it off, but recalibrating it to fit a new balance of power and interest.

So how does the Houthi mind think under pressure?

The only viable path may be a phased settlement; a verifiable ceasefire, the opening of roads, ports, and airports, addressing the salary crisis, and exchanging prisoners, followed by moving to a political dialogue that puts all the deferred questions on the table: the form of the state, the distribution of power and wealth, and the fate of the weapon. But will the militia accept that?

Many deals have been tried and failed in Yemen; because they reached the table before the state matured, or because they treated each war as a dispute between two parties, while Yemen is much more complex than that. It is a country of multiple identities and interests, even within the same family or tribal sheikhdom. Sometimes the divisions within them are more complicated than the clear lines of combat that appear on the map.

Therefore, before its time comes, the Houthi militia faces a clear equation: either it makes its military strength a bridge to politics, or it makes politics a hostage to its military strength. In the first case, power can transform into a position within a new Yemen. In the second, it may gain more war, temporary influence, and leverage, but not necessarily more Yemen.