جراح الخرائط الإيرانية

The visual indication is much more important than words... This is what journalism has taught us, and thus the tie worn by a leader like Sadat during his visit to Israel carries its symbolism, just as the color of the tie conveys partisan and intellectual connotations, whether in the East as seen in Lebanon, extending to the far West of the continent in the United States and Canada. The images in the backgrounds and during visits also play a role.

In the era of virtual meetings, guests appear on channels, each trying to send a message through the book left behind, or the painting or picture, while some come from an ordinary living room, making the lack of a message their message, as if to say, "Focus on what I am saying." Meanwhile, speakers and analysts from Iran, some of whom are Revolutionary Guards officers dressed as academics and analysts, ensure a common background.

This background is often a map, showing Iran and its central location, as a country with borders with seven nations, representing its gateways extending to Asia, China, and Russia via the Caspian Sea to the north, and a Gulf it calls Persian, attempting to dominate geography more than merely describing geography with coastlines extending to 1,800 km down to the Strait of Hormuz, as a region through which it can choke maritime trade and exhaust adversaries, even if they are weaker, benefiting from the mountainous nature east of the strait.

Geography in the Iranian psyche can be viewed on multiple levels. First, with the establishment of the Safavid state in 1501 by Shah Ismail I, the unifying context of Persian identity was established by declaring the Twelver Shia sect as the state religion. Although the name Iran predates the Safavids, what was achieved with them was geography as a connected political unit, broader than the geography of Iran today, and more importantly, it emotionally controlled Iraq through the Najaf reference, thus creating a unifying Shia framework in contrast to the state it was then contending with, the Ottoman rule.

However, the map has become a scar and wound in memory, especially during the 19th century, when Iran was definitively stripped of its territories in the South Caucasus after the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, subsequently relinquishing Georgia, Dagestan, and Azerbaijan. Fifteen years later, another humiliation for Iran came through the Treaty of Turkmenchay, which led to the removal of Armenia from its map.

In the second half of the century, what was termed the Great Game occurred, or the nibbling away of pieces of Iran to be placed on the table of British-Russian conflict. The Treaty of Herat in 1857 ended Britain's conflict with the Qajar state (which ruled Iran until 1925) and led to Iran's abandonment of Herat and Afghanistan, with Afghanistan representing a buffer state between British India and Tsarist Russia. Years later, the Akhal Treaty in 1881 resulted in Iran losing another part of its geography, which is present-day Turkmenistan, to Russia.

This historical background of an empire that historically sought expansion was reignited by Khomeini's thought, which sparked nostalgia for expansion again through the export of revolution. Then came the conflict with Saddam Hussein, from which the Iranians learned two lessons: first, to distribute their missiles and launch platforms and increase the number of dummy targets, and to enhance the efficiency of using mountain caves, diversifying entrances to warehouses and caves as much as possible, so they would not be an easy target like Saddam's army in '91.

The other lesson the Revolutionary Guard learned from Saddam is the importance of mapping the geography of the perimeter, which represents the protective bracelet for the wrist, so that the battle does not return to Iran. This led to the creation of a gambling axis, with a persistent effort to exploit all available opportunities like the Arab Spring, through which Tehran's rhetoric transformed into an Islamic discourse that transcended sectarian talk. Then, as ambitions rose, the discourse elevated itself, portraying itself as a protector of non-Muslim minorities in the East.

However, everything that happened from October 7, 2023, leading up to the twelve-day war, significantly changed the mentality of the Iranian regime, and it began to formulate a strategy of strike unity rather than front unity, following the departure of Sinwar, Nasrallah, and Bashar al-Assad.

In this context, we understand Abbas Araghchi's boastfulness in his first interview with the Iranian local media, when he proudly stated that the region was shocked by being targeted by Iran, and that no one would export oil as long as we do not export, which we can call "Geography of Harm," which does not target, for example, the American Incirlik base in Turkey, nor does it naturally target direct American and Israeli objectives that could obliterate harm from Iranian geography.

We see the geography of chaos extending with the export of weapons to the Houthis on civilian planes to encourage them to close the Bab el-Mandeb, which means the circle of harm is expanding to Egypt, which considers the Suez Canal one of the most important sources of revenue that has seen growth in recent months.

However, what quickly raises the numbers on the regime's pulse meter is the fear of an American ground invasion that could carve Bandar Abbas from the Iranian map, or some other islands used in the blockade of Hormuz. How could it not be so when it sees that even the Europeans have come to the conclusion that they do not mind relinquishing some geography of Ukraine to stop the battle with Putin?